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A ‘divorce blueprint’?  The use of heteronormative strategies in addressing 
financial remedies on same-sex partnership dissolution 
 
Abstract 
This article will explore data obtained through interviews with UK family law 
practitioners and clients with experience of financial relief on formalised same-sex 
relationship breakdown.  It will focus on questions around how solicitors have 
approached and argued their dissolution cases (and the extent to which they have 
drawn upon heteronormative arguments and case law), and whether both they and the 
clients believed that civil partnerships are, and should be, treated similarly to 
marriages.  The discussion will examine the different understandings of ‘equality’ 
employed, and interrogate the ways that the participants relied on ideas of sameness 
and difference.  It will argue that the solicitors placed particular stress on sameness, 
and that heteronormative constructs of gendered inequalities have been transplanted 
into same-sex cases, in a system where practitioners’ submissions are based on ‘what 
works’.  This is despite the fact that lesbian and gay couples do not map onto the 
‘template’ under which the parties have been subjected to different gendered 
expectations.  Conversely, the clients were less willing to take on the full legal 
implications associated with (heterosexual) marital breakdown, and less receptive of 
the solicitors ‘translating’ their matters to pigeonhole them into the existing 
framework. 
 
Key words: civil partnership; relationship breakdown; financial provision; equality; 
heteronormativity; legal practice. 
 
I. Introduction 
The system of financial relief of England and Wales is framed in a way that attributes 
legal actors with an integral role in shaping the law. The main statutory provision 
governing the division of assets, section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, 
dictates that the courts should take a number of factors into account in deciding how 
redistribution should be conducted (including the parties’ incomes and resources, their 
financial needs and obligations, and their standard of living).  The factors listed in the 
statute are not ranked, and it is discretionary how much weight is attributed to them.  
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 makes provision (at Schedule 5, Part 5) for financial 
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relief that corresponds with the 1973 Act.  Notably, at the time of writing, civil 
partnerships are only available to same-sex couples, although a test case has been 
launched challenging the ban on heterosexual civil partnerships (Bowcott 2014).  
Under the more recent legislation, as is the case with the former, lawyers are working 
to flesh out the bare bones offered by the statute.  That being the position, I argue that 
it is important to look behind the formal principles espoused, and to consider the 
normative frameworks working behind them.  I identify an important one of these as 
‘heteronormativity’, by which I mean that heterosexual identity and gendered 
practices are, “expected, demanded and always presupposed” (Chambers 2007, 662).  
I have in mind, “those structures, institutions, relations and actions that promote 
heterosexuality as natural, self-evident, desirable, privileged and necessary” 
(Cameron and Kulick 2003, 55).  Heteronormativity manifests in various practices 
that work to gender in accordance with notions of ‘maleness’ and ‘masculinity’ (and, 
thus, behaviour such as engaging in the production and circulation of commodities, 
and a disengagement with domestic labour) and ‘femaleness’ and ‘femininity’ 
(involving the performance of work within the home).  Legal practitioners have been 
tied into this ‘straightjacketed’ way of thinking, given that they will represent their 
clients on the basis of previous successes, and that they are themselves exposed to 
social norms.  At the same time, my empirical work suggests that legal actors are 
performing somewhat more of an active role, operating to repeat heteronormative 
relations. 
 
I have asserted elsewhere that, in the three significant (heterosexual) decisions of 
White v White [2001] 1 AC 596, Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 
AC 618, and Radmacher v Granatino [2011] 1 AC 534, the courts upheld 
heteronormative constructs of gendered inequality (Bendall 2014).  In White, the 
House of Lords set out a “yardstick of equality”, centering around 50/ 50 asset 
division.  Although the system of financial relief in England and Wales is not based 
on community of property, the “yardstick” aimed to implement something like this, 
with scope for adjustments to achieve fairness.  It arguably works on a difference-
blind, formal equality type approach that a person’s individual characteristics should 
be viewed as irrelevant in determining whether they have a right to gain.  This now 
forms the principled basis, at least in larger money matters (where the assets are in 
excess of the parties’ needs), on which law demands the assessment of financial 
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remedy.  The Court introduced this approach to address the differential positions of 
women and men, and it may be considered a positive development, protecting women 
against possible harms suffered within the family.  Indeed, it might be argued that 
little else could be done by the Court in this respect.  However, the judges missed out 
on the opportunity presented by the facts to convey a significant message relating to 
the organisation of family living and ‘women’s work’.  Insufficient emphasis was 
placed on the point that household chores need not be something completely unrelated 
to the activities of ‘breadwinners’ (with Mrs. White both having brought up the 
children and having worked on the farm).  In the later case of Miller/ McFarlane, a 
new element of ‘compensation’ was introduced into the financial remedy equation.  
This was intended to achieve a form of substantive equality (under which, the law 
applies differently to different groups), raising homemakers from their subordinate 
position.  Nevertheless, the economic obligations created by care giving under this 
element are quantified in terms of lost market opportunities.  Thereby, greater 
significance was placed on the traditionally ‘masculine’ role of market earning, with 
this working to sustain structural disadvantage.  Finally, I have contended that the 
decision to hold the husband in Radmacher to an unfavourable pre-nuptial agreement 
evinces a further type of formal equality, under which the husband and wife were 
treated as contracting parties.  The outcome seems to have been reached on the 
following bases: the husband’s failure to live up to his ‘masculine’ earning potential; 
his lack of (‘feminine’) vulnerability; or in recognition of his autonomy (as less 
frequently occurs with women). 
 
I contend that, in these cases, the courts expressly attempted to address a scenario 
where men and women adopt different roles in a (heterosexual) marriage.  In 
affirming this disparity, they naturalised traits that perpetuate the oppression of 
women.  Their judgments add force to the idea of women as being, “biologically 
domestic and dependent”, treating their difference from men as inherent (Sorial 2011, 
31).  Particularly, they work to reinforce assumptions about a ‘woman’s place’ that 
women have struggled for years to escape, with, “the law and legal institutions 
reflecting the idea of women as being ‘tied to the family’” (Fineman 1995, 16).  In 
spite of this, judicial reliance on such notions has fed into the way that solicitors 
advise their clients.  It appeared that civil partnership matters might hold the potential 
to pose new challenges to the use of these traditional stereotypes in the financial relief 
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context.  Butler (1999) has argued that “subversive” identities, such as those of 
lesbians and gay men, can help to demonstrate the constructed nature of gender roles, 
helping to destroy their normative status.  This is especially the case given Peel and 
Harding’s (2004) contention that, in the relative absence of pre-existing models, 
lesbian and gay relationships are conducted more creatively than different sex 
couples.  Indeed, same-sex couples do appear to do many things differently to 
heterosexual couples (Kurdek 2007; Patterson et al. 2004).  Yet, Lawrence v. 
Gallagher [2012] 1 FCR 557, the first reported same-sex case of this kind, suggested 
that the parties were still presented so as to be understandable on heteronormative 
terms.  Although concentrating less on depicting them in accordance with a binary 
model of familial roles, both (male) parties appeared to be judged on the same 
(money-earning) basis, marking little change in the application of assumptions about 
‘masculinity’.  In this way, the case indicated that civil partners are being assimilated 
into the heterosexual norm.  Of course, though, to focus on Lawrence alone provides 
an incomplete picture of how the law is operating in these new circumstances.  It is 
for this reason that I embarked upon conducting in-depth interviews with 14 solicitors 
of England and Wales who had had experience of civil partnership matters, alongside 
10 people who had sought legal advice on their own dissolution. 
 
This article will explore the data obtained in those interviews.  It will assert that 
heteronormative constructs have been transplanted into civil partnership cases, with 
emphasis being placed on sameness of treatment between same and different sex 
couples.  This is notwithstanding both client attempts to emphasise difference and the 
fact that, in the context of same-sex relationships, there is less of a need to address 
gender-specific forms of distributive injustice.  The article will argue that, rather than 
being treated as “other”, lesbians and gay men are being, “included into the dominant 
system” (Boyd and Young 2003, 757).  That being the case, they are being denied 
their radical potential in relation to social transformation, and the existing system of 
norms is being strengthened.  The law’s assimilation discourse is resulting in a failure 
to expose the constructed nature of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ roles in formalised 
relationships, and to cast light on broader changes in family life. 
 
II. Methods 
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The dataset in this research originates from an interviewing project undertaken 
between September 2013 and June 2014.  This method was selected because it was 
felt that hearing how things are working ‘on the ground’ would best enable the 
gathering of information about heteronormative practices.  The focus of the project 
was chosen because the law, “is not exclusively encompassed by case law and the 
discourse of high-ranking judges […] it is also what fairly low-ranking solicitors do 
every day” (Smart 1984, 149).  The solicitors’ firms were identified through carrying 
out an Internet search for the term ‘civil partnership dissolution solicitor’.  The firms’ 
websites were subsequently examined to establish whether any of the solicitors’ 
profiles specified that they had experience of advising on civil partnership (and, 
where this information could not be located, the heads of the firms’ family 
departments were e-mailed).  In total, 291 firms were contacted, of which 
practitioners from 10 different firms agreed to participate.  It had been hoped that the 
solicitors would provide introductions to their clients, with further interview 
participants being attained in this way, and this did occur twice.  However, it soon 
became clear that many of the firms contacted had not advised on a high number of 
civil partnership cases and, in addition, several solicitors were reluctant to grant 
access to their clients.  Accordingly, an advertisement was sent to 217 lesbian and gay 
organisations, mailing lists, and publications with a potential interest in the subject, in 
an attempt to recruit people that had sought legal advice.  Twitter was also employed, 
with direct ‘tweets’ being sent to 87 individuals and organisations and relevant ‘hash 
tags’ being utilised (such as ‘#LGBT’, ‘#LGBTQ’ and ‘#LGBTfamilies’), and details 
of the project featured on the notice boards of two online forums. 
 
In terms of the solicitors interviewed, five were males and nine females, and 11 
identified as heterosexual, two as lesbian and one as gay.  They ranged from 28 to 59 
years of age and dealt with cases concerning a range of assets, from modest amounts 
to multi-million pound matters.  The solicitors were located in the Southwest and 
Southeast of England, Greater London and the Midlands, and their exposure to civil 
partnership matters extended from having assisted more senior solicitors (in a junior 
capacity), to having advised on around 50 such cases.  Of the clients, six were men 
and four were women, and six identified as gay, two as lesbians, one as both, and one 
as bisexual.  They ranged from 38 to 54 years of age, and they resided across Greater 
London and the Midlands.  Their assets ranged from very little to significant and, 
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whilst three were in the process of dissolution and asset division, seven had 
completed this.  The partners’ relationships varied in length: although one client had 
been with her partner for 25 years, a further one spent only a week living with her 
civil partner, with there having been a year of prior cohabitation.  The data obtained 
from these participants were examined using thematic analysis to identify dominant 
themes, and this revealed insights into the ways in which solicitors have been 
negotiating the issue of gender in gay and lesbian financial relief cases. 
 
Three themes, relevant to heteronormativity, were apparent in the data, the initial of 
which relates to the earlier interactions between practitioner and client, whilst the 
others concern the construction of the case itself.  The first was that the solicitors 
asked their same-sex partner clients the same questions that they would ask a client in 
a different sex relationship, and that they appeared not to be permitting answers that 
did not fit the gendered ‘script’.  Secondly, they have presented their cases so as to 
centre around gendered stereotypes that have been carried over from the heterosexual 
cases.  The third (related) theme is that legal actors have tended to view ‘equality’ as 
entailing sameness of treatment or, in the case of asset division, a 50/ 50 split (as per 
the judgment in White).  I will now discuss each of these themes, highlighting how 
heteronormative constructs of gender inequalities have been applied. 
 
III. Asking the same questions (and only hearing the same answers) 
In terms of the conduct of their meetings with their clients, there was a level of 
inconsistency as to whether there would be a disparity between the questions that the 
practitioners would ask their civil partner and married (heterosexual) clients.  Mr. 
Henry∗, for example, considered that, “the fact-finding is different” on the basis that, 
“the things that were relevant in the relationship would have been different”.  When 
asked how his questions would vary, he struggled to explain, ultimately considering 
the main difference to be the lack of children in lesbian and gay households.  Mr. 
Arnold moreover set out how, “you’ll want to know about how [same-sex partners 
have] ordered their lives, possibly a bit more than you would in a straight case”, 
whilst Ms Gale asserted that she sought to ensure that her questions were, “as open as 
                                                        
∗
 Clients have been assigned first names and practitioners surnames, to allow them to be distinguished. 
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possible, so that they don’t feel like, actually, you’ve stereotyped them into a box”.  
That said, Ms Gale’s responses were contradictory, given that she proceeded to state 
that, “civil partnership couples are no different to heterosexual couples”.  Indeed, the 
practitioners more frequently claimed that there was no marked distinction in what 
they would ask lesbian and gay clients.  Ms Lane, for instance, set out how she would 
talk with them at the initial meeting about, “the usual things”, and Ms Boyce stated 
that her preparation for such a meeting would be, “the same as any family client”.  
She did consider that she would be “more tentative” in delivering her advice because, 
“it’s not as if you can put your finger on something and say, ‘look, this has happened 
before and we’re really sure about this, because this has been to the Supreme Court'”.  
Yet, she explained that her advice had been, “generally based on all of the 
matrimonial work that I have done before for heterosexual… because, you know, the 
factors are so similar in the way that it’s been drafted, that’s what we’re basing it on”. 
 
Such descriptions accord with the experience of client Caroline, whose solicitor had 
asked her questions concerning, “how long I’ve been married, […] the normal sort of 
questions that, you know, a solicitor would ask a married couple” (it is argued that the 
use of the terminology of ‘marriage’ is, in itself, significant).  She had an informed 
perspective on this, having previously experienced a (different sex) divorce.  On a 
related note, Jennifer set out how her legal representatives did not, “ask any additional 
questions to find out if there’s a difference” between same and different sex familial 
life, “perhaps out of embarrassment, or lack of knowledge”.  She explained how, “if 
somebody doesn’t do that, you’re not going to volunteer anything that you perceive, 
because you don’t know whether it’s relevant, when you’re talking to somebody 
whose time is being charged at god knows what by the hour”.  The client’s response is 
striking, because it suggests not only that the solicitors that may be asking the (wrong) 
questions, but also that they are not encouraging answers that fall outside of 
traditional norms.  Jennifer’s impression furthermore sits compatibly with Calhoun’s 
(2000, 34) point that lesbians and gay men feel obliged to present themselves in 
accordance with heterosexuality as a, “condition of access to the public sphere”.  A 
repercussion is that they are denied the possibility to tell their legal representatives 
new stories about their relationships, with the potential of their more “democratized, 
flexible model” of domestic life going unrealised (Weeks 2004, 161).  Interestingly, 
both bodies of interviewee perceived that civil partner clients may feel more 
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comfortable where the solicitor themselves is a lesbian or a gay man; Isaac considered 
that this would have reduced his feeling that, “I was being judged”.  Nonetheless, 
around 97% of those responding to a question in the Law Society’s (2014, 10) 
practising certificate holder survey identified as heterosexual, and even those that did 
not are subjected to the same pressures, in a precedent-based system, to accord with 
existing case law. 
 
In the context of a lack of reported dissolution cases, the practitioners adopted a 
directed (heteronormative) approach to advising their civil partner clients.  Mr. 
Arnold emphasised how he would say to a client, based on his experience in 
heterosexual cases, that, “this is the stuff that courts look at, and so let’s try to focus 
on this, and […] yes, I know that that’s really important to you, but it’s not going to 
make any difference”.  In that way, the solicitor was, “legitimating some parts of 
human experiences and denying the relevance of others” (Sarat and Felstiner 1995, 
147)).  Mr. Arnold’s response here supports Harding’s (2011) observation that “legal 
knowledge” excludes other forms of knowledge, in addition to Smart’s (1989) 
argument that legal professionals will disqualify alternative accounts in favour of 
“legal relevances”.  Ms Field likewise described how, “you sit at this side of the desk 
and you so easily just get into the script.  You just throw it at them”, whilst Ms Gale 
detailed how she sought to provide her clients with, “an honest answer as to whether 
the things in their life matter” (which is noteworthy, given her above discourse about 
openness). 
 
Overall, it appears that there are, in practice, understood to be few differences 
between conducting advisory meetings with civil partnership clients, and advising 
heterosexual partners on divorce.  A shortage of experience of civil partnership cases 
has led solicitors to place stress on a sameness approach between same and different 
sex relationships, as opposed to the accommodation of difference.  Practitioners have 
sought to include same-sex matters within their knowledge base developed from 
heterosexual divorce proceedings (and legal precedents).  In so doing, and by 
focusing on the things that ‘matter’, they have been fitting their same-sex clients into 
the heteronormative mould.  Such an approach is congruous with the overall strategies 
adopted by the practitioners for arguing their lesbian and gay clients’ cases, which I 
will now explore. 
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IV. Arguing on the basis of gendered stereotypes 
Prior to considering the tactics employed to present same-sex matters, I will examine 
the practitioners’ reports of what has been happening in different sex cases.  This is 
given that the way that solicitors construct their cases will be driven by what they 
perceive that the courts want to hear.  In this respect, Ms Boyce contended that, 
“you’ve got to be expecting that the judge is going to be dealing with it as a divorce 
case, because that is what they know, that is what you know”.  That assertion 
complies with O’Donovan’s (1993, 64) argument that lawyers present their clients so 
as to appear as though they are performing an “appropriate social role” as a “normal 
member of society”, as well as with Sarat and Felstiner’s (1995) suggestion of 
lawyers’ participation in the “normalisation of identities”.  Bearing out my previous 
submissions, the solicitors set out how divorce matters have centered around ideas of 
there being distinct roles for men and women in a marriage, with a patterning of status 
taking place.  Mr. Arnold referred to there being an “open secret” that “men and 
women are […] viewed differently be the courts”.  Whilst stressing that the courts, 
“do affiliate women with children”, he described how, even where childless, “women 
are still treated very paternalistically”.  Ms Gale, repeating this sentiment, noted a 
desire amongst judges to “protect” wives, presumably on the basis of their ‘feminine’ 
vulnerability.  Conversely, men remaining at home are treated less favourably.  This 
not only bears relation to the notion of the providing ‘masculine’ man, but also a 
claim by Ms Field that, “it’s easier for the courts to work out what is a contribution to 
the welfare of the family when it’s done by a woman […] it’s just what we’re used 
to”. 
 
Such perceptions of heterosexual cases must be borne in mind when considering the 
accounts of same-sex matters.  This is as a result of assertions, such as that made by 
Mr. Derrick, that, “we have a framework there, and the case law should be relatively 
applicable across”.  Ms Clarke emphasised that, “I would literally apply all of the 
principles that I do already”, whilst Mr. Kennedy highlighted how the case of 
Lawrence had demonstrated to him that, “the rules are exactly the same”.  Ms Gale 
adopted a less confident line, providing civil partner clients with a “cautionary note”.  
Nevertheless, the nature of that note was that, “we’re going to have to advise you on 
the basis of what it would look like on a heterosexual relationship, umm, until a 
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bigger bank of case law is increased”.  This occurred when client Debbie sought legal 
advice, and the solicitor sought to explain her position by using fictional scenarios 
concerning himself and his wife.  Returning to the practitioner perspective, Mr. 
Kennedy used a similar strategy where he described saying to a civil partner client 
that, “I’m sure that you know somebody that’s been divorced.  These are the claims 
that would have arisen, and these are the same claims that arise here”. 
 
It may be unsurprising that the solicitors should adopt this approach, given that Mr. 
Arnold explained how, “we’re told repeatedly, ‘it’s the same as marriage’”, and, “to 
use the divorce cases”.  Not only this, but a number of the solicitors mentioned the 
fact that the forms are now the same, with Ms Clarke setting out how, “it’s a divorce/ 
dissolution/ judicial separation petition […] everything has been amalgamated”.  We 
might question the appropriateness of this, given the lack of desire expressed to 
abolish civil partnership in light of the recently passed same-sex marriage legislation, 
signifying a continuing wish for a separate institution (Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport 2014).  In spite of this, the indications from the data are that practitioners 
are reverting back to heteronormative assumptions when dealing with civil 
partnerships and, particularly, to traditional ideas of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’.  
This works against the ideas that lesbian and gay identities can challenge the fixed 
categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’, and that formalised same-sex relationships might, 
“destabilise the gendered definition of marriage for everyone” (Hunter 1991, 12).  
With reference to relationship breakdown, the suggestion is that Graff’s (1997, 137) 
prediction that gay and lesbian partners will be treated as, “equal partners, neither 
having more historical authority” has not necessarily come to fruition.  Moreover, the 
responses gathered seem to support Smart’s (1992) portrayal of law as a gendering 
strategy.  By this, I mean that the law encourages the adoption of gendered subject 
positions and identities (with this tying in to O’Donovan’s (1993) argument that 
family law and its discourse constructs a gendered “story”). 
 
Anthony felt that, in his matter, “the whole premise” was that his partner was a 
“woman”.  Whilst Anthony had worked throughout the relationship, his partner had 
not, and this had been a “bone of contention”.  However, he described how his ex-
partner’s representatives had used this to their favour, arguing the case as if, “he gave 
up work, he brought up the children” (he was speaking figuratively, as there were no 
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children), and as though, “I literally would walk in and I would have my slippers at 
the door and supper on the table”.  The account of Mr. Arnold, Anthony’s solicitor, 
complied with this, as he explained how it had been asserted that the ex-partner, “did 
a lot, cooking and cleaning”, even though a cleaner had been employed.  In setting out 
how the legal actors, at least on one side, were, “posturing that one’s a man, one’s a 
woman”, Anthony detailed how his case was constructed to accord with a binary 
familial model.  Whilst it is, of course, recognised that financial disadvantage does 
still need to be addressed in the context of same-sex relationships, my intention here 
is to highlight this problematic labelling of the parties’ behaviour (reinforcing the idea 
that domestic labour is ‘women’s work’).  The client believed that, “prejudice was 
very much being pushed down the throat of the judge”, on the basis of preconceived 
views about relationships. 
 
Anthony highlighted how his ex-partner’s legal representatives contended that, “I 
wouldn’t have been earning what I earn if he hadn’t ‘supported’ me”.  He did not 
personally view the relationship in this way, although one wonders whether he would 
have adopted the same view had the relationship endured.  Moreover, it may be that 
an interview with Anthony’s partner would have revealed a different story.  It was not 
possible for practical reasons to recruit both parties of any relationship, meaning that 
it was unavoidable that there would be a reliance on one person’s narrative to 
extrapolate how the law constructs a couple.  It is recognised that this might seem 
somewhat problematic where the narratives may have contradicted one another, and 
that it offers only one perspective as to how the partners organised their family living.  
Nonetheless, the client felt that his career had already been progressing well when he 
had met his partner, and that, “I would probably have been in a similar situation had 
we not met”.  In terms of further arguments that were raised, Anthony described how 
the other side had submitted that, “we’d been accustomed to a joint lifestyle and [that] 
it was therefore ok for my ex to continue with that lifestyle without working”.  This 
submission relates back to heteronormative notions of (‘feminine’) economic 
dependency, whilst conceptions of joint living seem incompatible with suggestions of 
greater financial separateness amongst same-sex partners (Burgoyne et al. 2011). 
 
The client felt that he and his ex-partner had been “pigeonholed” to fit the existing 
framework, when, “the case law that is cited shouldn’t be heterosexual because 
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[same-sex couples are] different”.  Anthony considered that, “we didn’t run it on the 
other side saying that I was the man, I was the ‘breadwinner’”.  Alternatively, though, 
he described them as having, “tried to neutralise it and just say, ‘we’re two blokes 
[…] he needs to get a job’”.  Mr. Arnold’s account is compatible with that 
explanation, detailing how, “the way that we presented it was simply that […] he’s 
got a number of language skills, you know, he’s capable of earning a decent amount 
of money”.  This argument evinces what I have contended elsewhere to be the most 
persuasive interpretation of Lawrence, under which the parties were treated in 
accordance with formal equality, based on lack of gender difference (Bendall 2013).  
Anthony’s representatives were arguing that both parties should be judged according 
to pervasive notions of ‘masculinity’.  Therefore, in one way or another, the 
practitioners seemed unable to transcend heteronormative ideas about gender.  The 
indications were of an all-encompassing application of the heteronormative 
framework, with little consideration being given to the ways in which the parties’ 
lives may be unscripted. 
 
Similar observations might be made regarding the legal advice received by Isaac.  In 
accordance with the arguments made on Anthony’s partner’s behalf, the client 
described being informed that, “I was being seen as the breadwinner, he was being 
seen as the […] other party within the relationship that didn’t have the funds”.  In this 
case, the stress was not on his ex-partner’s domestic contributions.  Isaac expressed 
disappointment and frustration, though, that his solicitor had framed their discussion 
in terms of, “this is how it works for heterosexual couples”, responding that, “we’re 
not a heterosexual couple”.   It is significant that he should emphasise the different 
nature of same-sex relationships in the face of a sameness centered practitioner 
approach, and the suggestion is that a level of resistance has been maintained to legal 
heteronormativity.  The client opined that, “almost the divorce blueprint that they had 
been working with for, you know, decades, she was trying to fit that into, umm, a gay 
couple’s lifestyle, and it doesn’t work”, highlighting this especially to be the case in 
the absence of children.   
 
Isaac proceeded to contend that, “the divorce process […] hasn’t grown as society has 
changed […] it hasn’t, umm, evolved at all […] Divorce really is ‘one size fits all’”.  
It is noteworthy that that terminology should be selected, given that identical phrasing 
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was employed by George in stating that his solicitor had been, “sort of, ‘one size fits 
all’ with everything and, ‘well, there’s two of you, the same as if there were a man 
and a woman’”.  That description is consistent with a point raised by solicitor Ms 
Boyce about, “the risk that things will just be very much done as rote in terms of that, 
‘well, I’ve dealt with 3,000 divorce cases and now I’m starting to deal with civil 
partnerships, and this seems to fit the mould of what I’ve dealt with before’”.  She felt 
that, “there’s going to be a lot of match-up with the way that divorce cases have been 
dealt with as to the way that civil partnerships will be dealt with”, even where the 
facts were not directly comparable.  Ms Clarke implied the same, explaining how she 
“slipped” between the language of ‘divorce’ and ‘dissolution’ because the former is 
“what I do every day”. 
 
Returning to Isaac, the client explained how it had been submitted on his partner’s 
behalf (as will often be the case in relation to wives in heterosexual matters) that, 
because he had become accustomed to a “luxury lifestyle” during the relationship, he 
should still be able to, “expect to go and have nice food, […] have holidays”.  Isaac 
found such arguments, “difficult”, given that the scenario, “came down to two men in 
a relationship […] we could both go out and earn a fairly decent wage”.  The client’s 
response here, once more, harks back to ideas about ‘masculinity’, and it is possible 
that these could be attributed to his legal advisors (at least, to a degree), given that his 
account suggests that they behaved inflammatorily.  This was hinted at where Isaac 
reported having talked through with his solicitor, “why [his partner] wasn’t prepared 
to bring money into the family unit”.  However, it was most evident where he 
explained how they had said to him that, within his relationship, “I’m really sorry, but 
you have just been used”. 
 
Drawing this discussion together, within Anthony and Isaac’s matters, the financially 
weaker side placed greater weight on a binary construction of roles.  Conversely, the 
more moneyed side, particularly in Anthony’s case, put emphasis on the point that 
both partners were, as men, able to provide for themselves.  The former line of 
argument links in with solicitor assertions, such as that made by Ms Field (albeit with 
reference to a younger man with an older ex-partner), that there is a temptation to 
present a same-sex matter in a ‘breadwinner’/ ‘homemaker’ fashion.  In this way, the 
solicitor was explaining how she would draw on heteronormative constructs of 
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gendered inequalities to obtain a favourable result for her client.  She proceeded to set 
out how she would argue on her client’s behalf that, “I’ve supported you, I’ve ironed 
your shirts”.  Despite this, Ms Field felt it more difficult to argue on behalf of a gay 
client that, “I’ve stayed [within the] home and looked after it”, expressing the view 
that, “you’ve got to prove that more”.  She emphasised that, under such 
circumstances, “I would question them quite carefully about what they did”.  This 
comment is of note on two bases: firstly, because it suggests that a man performing 
the role of the ‘typical’ housewife has not done enough to obtain an equivalent award; 
but secondly, because an additional implication is that wives tend not to be asked 
“carefully about what they did” (presumably, because assumptions are made about the 
tasks that a housewife performs). 
 
Turning to the lesbian clients interviewed, traditional gender roles featured most 
heavily in Debbie’s account.  She described how her ex-partner argued that, “she was 
the main ‘breadwinner’”, even though Debbie had also worked part-time.  Although 
the client acknowledged that she had performed the majority of the domestic chores, 
she felt that there had been an over-emphasis by the legal actors on, “whether you’re 
the wife or the husband”.  In fact, Debbie’s view of the court proceedings in her 
matter was striking, with her perceiving that legal representatives, “speak on your 
behalf, and that’s it”. She set out how she had not understood the submissions made, 
consequently feeling, “completely out of my depth”, and expressing the opinion that, 
as a client, you lose control of your case to lawyers (see Harding 2011).  To take this 
idea further, whilst Smart (1984, 160) argues that lawyers “translate” matters into 
“legally recognisable categories”, that occurred to such an extent that the client’s 
conflict became unrecognisable to her.  This point was hinted at further by Jennifer, 
who considered that her solicitors, “see that they have a job to do, and they will take 
instructions from me [regardless of] whether I’m fully understanding of what to tell 
them”. 
 
As to the solicitors themselves, Mr. Derrick recounted how the opposing party in a 
lesbian matter that he had worked on had submitted that, “my client has been the 
homemaker, [so] sharing, compensation, needs, it’s all got to be in”.  In this way, they 
were arguing for an award that included the element of substantive equality that was 
introduced by Miller/ McFarlane.  This is despite the fact that, in same-sex 
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relationships, the parties are subjected to the same gendered expectations.  Of course, 
I am not arguing here that there necessarily cannot be a more vulnerable party in a 
same-sex relationship.  Nevertheless, the roles performed by each partner will tend to 
be based more on autonomy and choice, and to be less constrained by external rules 
(and, in any event, what I am intending to critique is the unthinking application of a 
framework that is mismatched with the parties’ realities) (Weeks 2007).  Mr. Derrick 
described how, in that particular case, the other side had portrayed their client as, 
“being supportive of her partner, who was the higher earner”.  He did, however, 
express uncertainty about where this ‘homemaker’ portrayal had originated from; he 
set out how the ex-partner had seemed, “quite happy to paint herself as the little 
woman.  Whether that was her or whether that was the advice that she was given, I 
don’t know, but I thought that it was quite a good approach”.  In a similar vein, Ms 
Boyce explained how, when acting for that side of the partnership that has stayed at 
home, “one would want to emphasise those features that are on the ‘feminine’ side, if 
you like.  So, for example, ‘oh, she cared for the elderly grandmother’ […] or, ‘she 
was nurturing something’”. 
 
As regards this association of women with caring, we find additional evidence in Ms 
James’s description of a case with shared childcare subsequent to dissolution.  She set 
out how there had been a disparity in salary between the women concerned, although 
the court had permitted a clean break.  The solicitor felt that, “that would not be 
allowed to happen if they were straight […] the judge would say, ‘no, we want 
nominal maintenance’”.  She believed that the outcome was reached because the court 
was confident that both parties, being women, would ensure that the children were 
looked after.  This was as opposed to the position where the man is more closely 
associated with ‘masculine’ providing, and the woman with ‘feminine’ caring.  In this 
way, assumptions still seem to have been made about the women on the basis of 
‘femininity’, with neither partner being treated as the money earner.  That observation 
works somewhat against Calhoun’s (2000) suggestion of lesbians being viewed as 
“ungendered”.  That said, the lesser earning party within Ms James’s matter was 
apparently not conceived of as vulnerable, as tends to occur in relation to female 
partners in heterosexual relationships.  There are hints that lesbians are almost being 
treated as ‘not-women’, in the sense of notions of traditional dependent ‘femininity’.  
This ties in with a point raised by Ms Irvine, albeit in relation to a dispute under the 
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Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 on the death of her client’s 
lesbian partner, that she had, “never been asked to do the amount of work that we had 
to do to prove dependency”. 
 
More broadly, though, the solicitors appeared to have been working to construct their 
clients’ cases to fit with heteronormative ideas about gender roles in relationships, 
missing the complexities of real life.  This is in spite of contentions that non-
heterosexual people are “in the vanguard”, having the capacity to become the “arch 
inventors” in society’s “life experiments” (Weeks 2004, 159).  It has been asserted 
that ‘queerness’ entails, “dyadic innovation and support for gender nonconformity” 
(Green 2010, 429).  However, lesbians and gay men have, to a large extent, been 
assimilated into the mainstream, with the radical potential of their formalised 
relationships diminishing.  It may be little wonder that this is occurring, given both 
that the formal legal framework largely mirrors that of marriage, and that the 
suggestions in the parliamentary debates concerning the 2004 Act were that it was 
intended to bring about “inclusion, rather than social change” (Stychin 2006, 81).  
Indeed, as Hunter (1991, 29) has acknowledged, “the impact of law often lies as much 
in the body of discourse created in the process of its adoption as in the final legal rule 
itself”.  Nevertheless, I argue that civil partnerships, having prima facie facilitated 
greater social and legal ‘equality’, have at the same stood to “impose a ‘marriage 
model’ based on traditional gendered power relations (Rolfe and Peel 2001, 324).  I 
will now interrogate the way that this idea of ‘equality’ featured in my interviewees’ 
narratives, focusing on the interlinked understandings of ‘equality’ between same and 
opposite sex couples and between the partners themselves. 
 
V. ‘Equality’ as sameness of treatment? 
As regards their discourses around ‘equality’ between same and different sex partners, 
the solicitors’ emphasis was again on formal equality, or sameness of treatment.  Mr. 
Arnold explained how the Law Society’s equality and diversity training led solicitors 
to understand that, “we must treat this exactly the same”.  The solicitor reported a 
barrister having stressed to him that, “judges are just so keen to show that there’s 
equality that it’s going to be no different from a married case”.  Ms Ennis employed 
identical terminology whilst setting out her view of equal treatment, explaining this as 
being because lesbians and gay men have, “the same expectations, lifestyle […] 
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they’re no different”.  Ms Irvine highlighted that “you should not distinguish at all”, 
whilst Ms Boyce even went so far as to say that, “if you are doing anything different 
to heterosexual couples, there is a danger that you’re going to be accused of being 
prejudiced”.  What we see here is little evidence of Fraser’s (2012) equality of 
‘recognition’.  Whereas that ascribes value to diversity, what is occurring is a 
misrecognition of the ways that same-sex relationships can be different.  Not only 
this, but the practitioners’ approach is incompatible with Ettelbrick’s (1997) 
understanding of “justice”, under which lesbian and gay couples are supported in spite 
of their differences from the “dominant culture”. 
 
Turning to the clients, however, this notion of formal equality likewise featured 
strongly, with respondents failing to recognise the heteronormativity of the 
frameworks into which inclusion was sought (Harding 2011).  My findings in this 
respect are consistent with Denike’s (2010, 148) assertion of the abandonment of 
queer critiques of the family in favour of access to “privileges of the state”.  Caroline 
considered that, “it doesn’t matter whether you’re gay or straight, you should be 
treated exactly the same”, and Heather contended that, were she a legal advisor, she 
would treat a civil partnership, “in the same way as I probably would, umm, a normal 
marriage”.  George similarly felt that the fact that the forms were the same for 
dissolution, “did feel more equal to divorce”, and Isaac considered it, “a milestone for 
lesbian and gay couples to be treated the same [as opposite sex couples] in the eyes of 
the law”. 
 
Conversely, Ms Field felt that, “you can’t compare the non-earning, or the lower 
earning, lesbian or gay partner to the wife and the mother […] because you can’t 
discriminate, can you, between men and men and women and women”.  As well as 
this, some practitioners placed emphasis on it only being appropriate to adopt a 
sameness approach where the facts are directly analogous.  Ms Gale, for example, 
only considered it possible to treat lesbian and gay couples the same as heterosexual 
couples without children (although arguments centering around sameness were, of 
course, adopted in relation to the childless clients discussed above).  One wonders, 
given the previous assertions about the routine application of the heteronormative 
framework, to what extent practitioners would recognise the circumstances of the 
cases before them as non-identical.  Yet, Mr. Derrick, taking the idea further, 
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recognised that, “there are cases where there are differences, there are cases where 
there are niche issues, there are ones that do require different thought processes”.  The 
practitioner was unspecific as to what these issues might be, although perhaps he was 
referring to the “demarcation of financial arrangements” that he raised in terms of his 
civil partner clients.  He was, though, contradictory on this point, also suggesting that, 
“there’s got to be a uniform way” of treating financial relief.   This sameness centered 
approach, which featured more commonly, might be criticised for, “fail[ing] to 
envision a […] transformative model of family life” (Polikoff 2000, 167)).  By 
attaining inclusion based on rationalising of this nature, lesbians and gay men may 
seem to become the champions of heterosexual marital values, thus reducing their 
potential to challenge the way that gender works in every relationship. 
 
Moving on to consider what ‘equality’ means in addressing potential economic 
inequalities on relationship breakdown, Ms Boyce asserted that it, “isn’t that [the 
partners] each keep what they’ve got.  It’s joining everything that they both own, 
whether it’s in […] their sole name [or not], and putting it in a pot and then dividing 
it”.  Again, the solicitor is arguably neglecting to notice the financial separateness that 
may be a more common feature amongst same-sex couples and, consequently, the 
lesser degree to which it may be appropriate to transfer property between partners on 
relationship breakdown.  In a similar vein, Mr. Henry viewed that, “I can’t see that the 
concept of sharing would be any different [in the civil partnership context] after a 
long relationship”.  A number of the solicitors suggested relationship length to be a 
determining factor, with shorter relationships being approached more on the basis 
that, “you come in with what you go out with” (as expressed by Ms James).  As to the 
more substantial relationships, though, Mr. Arnold considered that, “the door’s shut, 
for the time being at least, for doing anything but 50/ 50”.  He further contended that, 
“most of our cases are not many tens of millions and the reality is that, in the courts 
on a day-to-day basis, most judges are not interested in arguments about an unequal 
division”.  Despite the solicitor’s claims about his caseload, Mr. Arnold deals with 
relatively large money matters, and his comments should be considered as against 
those of solicitors working on more ‘everyday’ cases.  Ms Lane, for example, viewed 
it to be “rare” to come across a case where the assets are divided 50/ 50, as a result of 
‘needs’.  Even so, she stated that, “cases we negotiate, you try to get as near to 50/ 50 
as you can” (and this seems consistent with Hitching’s (2010) point that the ‘big 
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money’ principles have been given weight in larger value everyday cases).  A more 
formal (White-based), difference-blind approach to equality still seems, at least to an 
extent, to have influence, and this might be difficult to justify in relationships where 
there is no particularly vulnerable party. 
 
Returning to Mr. Arnold, the practitioner contended that his approach was based on 
the notion that, “if you’re signing up to a contract of marriage or civil partnership, you 
should expect to share what you bring in”.  My data have suggested that this is not 
necessarily what many civil partners have been expecting (although, notably, the 
partners’ surprise was more in terms of ongoing responsibilities).  For instance, Ms 
Field set out how her lesbian and gay clients would, “often come and they’ll give me 
a mathematical calculation of what they’ve paid, and I don’t usually get that” in 
heterosexual cases.  Notwithstanding this, Ms James reported a number of “relatively 
half/ half” outcomes, whilst client Isaac was advised that his ex-partner may be 
entitled to 50% of the assets (“under the terms of marriage”) had he not agreed to pay 
a sum in settlement.  Mr. Derrick furthermore described how, in a lesbian matter that 
he had advised on, “we divided things up pretty much equally… there was a division 
of capital that worked about 55-45%”.  Here, the solicitor rationalised a near-50/ 50 
division using a substantive conception of equality, explaining that it put the 
financially weaker party in a stronger position (which he considered “fair”, given the 
substantial length of the relationship). 
 
That said, it was recognised that ‘equality’ can require something more complicated 
than splitting the assets in half.  Ms Lane, for example, explained that, whilst, “you 
start at 50/ 50 […] you have to then, you know, measure against all of these other 
factors”.  Even so, the use of this ratio of apportionment at all might be considered 
problematic (as it was by Ms Field) given that, “you’re imposing this heterosexual 
model on [people’s relationships] and saying […] ‘we’re going to assume that you 
started as a sharing relationship, and then give us reasons why we shouldn’t think 
that’”.  Indeed, Anthony, whilst not disagreeing with the ratio per se, viewed that the 
approach in civil partnership matters, “has actually become unequal, because they 
[…] try to impose a heterosexual stereotype over you and then try to work out what to 
do”.  In fact, as against the discussion above, a few practitioners reported 
encountering clients that were not seeking sameness of treatment in relation to 
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financial relief.  Ms Ennis described how, “some do have high expectations that 
they’re going to get different treatment”, whilst Mr. Kennedy observed the presence 
of, “a pre-conception that things are going to be different”.  As to what this difference 
may be, Ms James said that her civil partner clients had tended to agree that, “we 
won’t give each other any compensation and we won’t pay maintenance […] you’ve 
had more money than me, and you always will”.  The suggestion was of an alternative 
approach to finance on relationship breakdown to that which has developed through 
the heterosexual case law, and one which stands in contrast to Ms Boyce’s statement 
that, “I don’t see why, in a civil partnership, you should be any less entitled to be 
maintained by your partner than you are in a marriage”.  Ms James elaborated that 
same-sex partners’ views of equality do not match those of solicitors, in that, 
“equality of ‘outcome’, they don’t get that.  That’s not something that civil partners 
think about, whereas it’s very much in the mind of, I think, straight married couples”. 
 
The solicitor’s point was supported by client Debbie, who regarded as central the idea 
that, “if you’ve put this in, then you’re entitled to that percentage out”.  She asserted 
that the 50/ 50 division of the proceeds of the sale of their property, reached at the 
Financial Dispute Resolution hearing, had been drawn, “without seeing any of the real 
evidence”.  The client set out how, “if two people came in and they said, you know, 
we’ve got a biscuit here and we’ve got to share it, [the law would say] ‘well, cut it in 
half, have half each’”, feeling that, “the fact that one person […] contributed towards, 
you know, the majority of that biscuit” is not taken into account.  By this, she was 
referring to the contribution of her inheritance towards the purchase of the home, 
which she considered was not adequately reflected in the asset apportionment.  
Debbie held perceptions of ‘fairness’ which she viewed as being more important than 
‘equality’, in the sense that the latter was conceived of in White.  It may, of course, be 
the case that such perceptions are also held by heterosexual people that bring the 
greater quantity of money into their relationship.  This is given that the 50/ 50 
approach to division is a legal construct that replaced a less generous approach to the 
economically weaker party.  However, the indication within my data is that these 
opinions may be more common in same-sex matters given, for example, Ms Field’s 
statement that, “it’s so part of the culture that marriage means sharing, whereas civil 
partnership…?  I don’t know” (hinting that the term carries alternative connotations). 
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Anthony further contended that more stress should be placed on the parties’ 
“contribution or detraction, in financial terms”.  This works contrary to the idea, 
described by Burgoyne (1990), that all assets should be shared, regardless of who 
contributed what.  In fact, his attitude goes against the notion in the heterosexual case 
law that the parties’ different contributions should each be regarded as no less 
valuable than the other (unless one of their contributions was “stellar”  (Cowan v 
Cowan [2001] 2 FLR 192)).  Not only this, but Anthony’s understanding lacks any 
recognition of the non-financial ways that people can contribute to relationships.  
Conversely, Heather stressed that, “if you’re not contributing as much financially but 
you’re contributing more in other ways, then that does have a value” (although 
pointing out that, “how you put a value on that, I’m not really sure”).  All the same, in 
her relationship, Heather described having settled the finances by presenting her ex-
partner with, “a piece of A4 paper with, umm, what we both put into the property”.  
One can only imagine that Anthony’s views were shaped by his beliefs of his 
partner’s lack of economic and domestic activity, as well as the substantial earnings 
that he personally brought into the relationship.  He considered that, “whichever way 
you shape equality, the measuring stick needs to change.  Maybe it needs to change 
[so] that you’re two individuals and you look at the circumstances of the individuals”, 
as opposed to viewing the parties as “men and women”. 
 
The emphasis placed by the clients on financial contributions, as against contributions 
of a less quantifiable nature, is likely to be at least partially reflective of their lack of 
children.  In any case, the purpose of this article is not to argue that those who have 
remained at home to care should not receive financial support on relationship 
breakdown.  However, what was apparent from the client accounts was that the ways 
that they conceived of ‘equality’ were often incongruous with those of the solicitors 
(and that heteronormative assumptions and constructs seemed to have been applied 
even where children were not present).  Several clients spoke in favour of a concept 
of ‘equality’ that is more sophisticated than a straightforward 50/ 50 division, and 
more reflective of the circumstances of individual relationships.  It is recognised (and 
was highlighted by Professor Robert Leckey in discussion with the author, September 
23, 2014) that the greater the need to investigate into individual circumstances, the 
more that it becomes necessary to instruct lawyers.  This may be problematic, given 
the absence of legal aid in relationship breakdown matters in England and Wales.  
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Still, I argue that moving beyond the unthinking and universal application of a 
heteronormative framework is instructive not only in the same-sex context, but also in 
relation to divorce matters, given that many different sex relationships are also lived 
non-normatively. 
 
In sum, in relation to equality, the clients and solicitors alike commonly relied on a 
wider discourse of formal equality between same and different sex couples.  This may 
reflect the fact that legal struggles have centered around claims that, “lesbian and gay 
relationships mirror those of heterosexual couples “ (Young and Boyd 2006, 228).  
Nevertheless, such discourse is unlikely to offer the kind of role transformations that 
we might to have wished to have been instigated by formalised same-sex 
relationships.  As against this, whilst the practitioners adopted a similar approach to 
financial remedies between civil partners as has occurred in the (heterosexual) divorce 
context, the gay and lesbian clients appeared to offer some resistance to the 
imposition of heterosexual relational norms.  Moreover, it seemed that they would 
prefer to ‘opt out’ of the remedies introduced to address (heteronormative) 
assumptions about necessary dependency, which may in part be because of a higher 
degree of financial independence within their relationships.  In this way, the legal 
frameworks surrounding civil partnership dissolution and the attitudes and behaviour 
of same-sex partners might sit uncomfortably with one another. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
As a result of their lack of familiarity with civil partnership and of a shortage of case 
law, legal actors, when addressing financial relief, appear to be placing a stress on 
sameness of treatment and formal equality between same and different sex couples.  
The solicitors in my study widely constructed the issues in their same-sex matters as 
being identical to those in married cases.  This may be unsurprising, given the 
legislative history of the 2004 Act, and the fact that the frameworks surrounding civil 
partnership dissolution are similar to the legal approach to (different sex) divorce.  
Nonetheless, it is in tension with the fact that lesbian and gay couples, given their lack 
of gender disparity, hold “unique possibilities for the construction of egalitarian 
relationships” (Weeks 2004, 159). 
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In a system focused on precedent, practitioners are adhering to notions of equal 
division as they feature in the key (heterosexual) cases.  Consequently, they appear to 
be reverting back to heteronormative constructs of gender inequalities that are 
incompatible with the conduct of many households’ lived realities.  My data suggest 
that the strategy of encouraging the adoption of traditionally gendered subject 
positions is being extended over into civil partnership proceedings.  That being the 
case, the law of financial relief is working to reproduce heterosexual behaviour as the 
norm.  Practitioners are not attributing lesbians and gay men with equality of 
‘recognition’ and are not responding to the ways in which lesbian and gay clients are 
different.  This is despite hints of client efforts to highlight such difference, which 
signal a continuing level of resistance to legal heteronormativity (although, the 
potential transformative effects of this are being blunted). 
 
The intention of this article is to offer critique, rather than to set out what an 
alternative, queerer law of financial relief should look like.  It is argued, though, that 
understandings of legal equality need to shift.  Present indications are that same-sex 
relationships are being assimilated into the marriage model in the realm of legal 
recognition.  This risks leaving essentialist assumptions about male and female roles 
intact, and enables underlying criticism of the way that gender works in marriage to 
become “marginalized, even silenced” (Polikoff 1993, 1549).  Indeed, it reduces the 
capacity of same-sex relationships to denaturalise and dismantle the historical 
constructions of gender that marriage has centered around, so as to alter contemporary 
understandings of gender in all formalised relationships. 
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